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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN W .. NIELSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
GLEN :\IAUCHLEY,
Defendant and Respondent.

)
Case No. 7203
\

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, in and for Cache Countv, State of Utah .
.I

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT
This appeal is taken from a judgment of the Honorable :\Iariner :\L :\Iarrison, District Judge, whereby and
wherein on the 5th day of ~1arch, 1948, he directed averdict in favor of the defendant, no cause for action, and
entering judgment thereon in favor of the defendant, and
thereafter, on the 22nd day of :March, 1948, on proper application refused to grant plaintiff a new trial. ( Tr. 33,
35, 36, 41, 58, 172, 173.
PLEADINGS
The plaintiff set forth that on the 9th day of January,
1947, the defendant carelessly and negligently backed a
school bns front a private driveway into a public street;
that the same was caused to collide with plaintiff's automobile which he was driving; that he was negligent in
failing to keep a proper lookout for vehicle travelling on
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the highway and particularly the vehicle of the plaintiff;
that he failed and admitted to have control of the school
bus; that he failed and admitted to yield the right-of-way
to plaintiff; that he backed the school bus into the highway without giving a signal or warning of his intention to
do so; that the plaintiff's automobile was damaged and he
sustained personal injuries. Damages in the sum of $8,
331.26 were asked. ( Tr.4,6) .
.-\_ NSWER
The answer admits all the allegations of the complaint except the damages and the negligence charged.
Defendant alleged contributary negligence of the plaintiff setting forth that he was negligent driving 35 miles
an hour knowing the road was icy and slippery; that he
failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles entering the
road; that knowing the road was icy and slippery, he applied his brakes causing his automobile to skid across the
road striking the school bus; that plaintiff did not have
his automobile under control in that after observing the
scholl bus he failed to reduce his speed so as to pass the
bus without having to apply his brakes in an attempt to
reduce the speed thereof. ( Tr. 12, 13).
Upon the issues thus framed, a trial was had before
the Honorable Mariner M. Morrison sitting with a jury
on the 5th day of ~1arch, 1948.
THE EVIDENCE
The public road on which the collision occurred is
oiled and hard surfaced extending in a easterly and westerly direction in Cache County, Utah, known as the ColSponsored
by the S.J.
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Library Services
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85 feet wide from fence to fence; hard oiled surface, 16
feet wide; the shoulders on each side, 6 feet wide from the
north shoulder to the north fence is about 24 feet and
from the south shoulder to the south fence is about 33
feet. ( Tr. -t 13, 60, 61, 88.) It intersects with Highway
91, also known as the Logan-Hyrum Road, at a point
about four miles south of Logan, Utah, at which point it
terminates. Tr. 4, 13, 64.)
The collision complained of took place on the College
"Yard-Millville Road at a point about 443 feet West of the
intersection and out from the private driveway of the defendant. The driveway nms in a northerly and southerly
direction just east of and into defendant's house. (Tr. 65,
135. ) The defendant's house is situated on the north side
of the road. ( Tr. 102.)
On the morning of the 9th day of January, 1948, the
defendant left his house at Youngward, Utah, at about
7:20 a. m., driving his automobile. He drove generally in
an easterly direction toward his intended destination of
Avon and Paradise, eventually travelling on the College
"Vard-.Millville Road. He was travelling at the rate of
about 25 miles per hour and in his lane of traffic on the
south portion of the road. (Tr. 61, 89.) The night before,
it rained, and having froze during the night and the roads
were icy and slippery. This fact was known to both the
plaintiff and defendant. (Tr. 63, 133.)
When the plaintiff reached a point about 300 feet
west of the defendant's house, he saw a school bus, which
defendant was driving, emerging in a backward, southt~
erly direction from the east side of his house along his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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his foot off the accelerator and the speed of his automobile
decrease to about 20 miles per hour. As he went over a
culvert, the bus was · somewhere between defendant's
fence line and the north shoulder of the road. The culvert is about 229 feet west of defendant's house. (Tr. 64,
65, 136.) He continued to watch the school bus, thinking
it would stop, he thought this until he reached a point
about half way between the culvert and defendant's
house, or about 115 feet away, when he decided that it
was not going to. When confronted with this situation,
the plaintiff applied his brakes but couldn't stop because
of the slippery condition of the road. The defendant~ instead of stopping and yielding the right-of-way as plaintiff had a right to expect and did expect, continued to back
the school bus south-easterly across the road until the
rear wheels of the school bus were about 2 feet off the
south line of the hard surface of the highway, blocking
the road. (Tr. 6S, 66, 88, 93, 96.) The school bus was 29.0
feet long, 8 fe~t wide and weighed 12,000 pounds. (Tr.
90, 111.)
The plaintiff atempted to avoid a collision by applying his brakes and turning to the north side of the road,
thinking that the defendant would stop and permit him
to pass. As he did so, the defendant started the school
bus in a forward position, and just as the rear left wheel
of the bus cleared the center of the road to the north about
2 feet, the collision occurred. The plaintiff's automobile
was about straddle the center of the road. ( Tr. 66, 98.99.)

I

r

I

In explaining his attempt to avoid the collision, the
plaintiff testified: (A) ..As I was watching his bus, I saw
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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coming out across the highway until I got down about half
wa~· between the culvert and his dri\'eway when he came
out, and I tried to stop but it couldn't be done. As he
backed out, there was a telephone or electric light pole on
the south side of the road, and there was no chance for me
to go between the pole and the rear end, and I coudn"t get
between the fence and the pole, and his being in the position he was, I figured I could get in front of him, but just
as I turned my car to go, he pulled up in front of me. I
then turned my car back on the ice." (Tr. 65,66.)
The defendant neither gave a signal that he was going to back across the road nor did he sound his horn nor
give any warning that he intended to do so. ( Tr. 66.)
Since the damage and injuries are not in
we will not detail them. here.

question~

In considering this appeal, we must take the evidence
most favorable to the appellant.

GROESBECK V. LAKESIDE PRINTING CO.
55 Utah 335, 186 P. 10.3.
ROACH V. RAILROAD CO.,
69 Utah 530, 256 P. 1061.
:\ liLLER V. WHITE,
70 Utah 145- 258 P. 565.
BARLOW V. UTAH LIGHT & TRACTION CO.,
77 Utah 556, 298 P. 386.
RICKS V. BUDGE,
91 Utah 307, 64 P. ( 2d) 208.
HEDDEN V. TOWN OF BINGHAM CANYON,
94 Utah 442, 78 P. ( 2d) 637.
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UHR V. EATON,
95 Utah 309, 80 P. (2d) 925.
LEE V. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.,
95 Utah 445, 82 P. (2d) 178.
GRAHAr..t V. JOHNSON, et. al.
166 P. (2d) 230
At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant
made a motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that
the plaintiff had failed to show any negligence on the
part of the defendant as alleged in his complaint: ( 1)
That he failed to keep a proper lookout.
( 2) That he
failed and admitted to have his automobile under control.
( 3) That he failed to yield the right-of-way. ( 4) That
he failed to give a signal or warning of his intention to
back into the highway. ( 5) That such were not the approximate cause of plaintiff's damage and injuries. ( Tr.
166, 170.)

,

The Court held that in-as-much as the plaintiff was
travelling 25 miles an hour when 300 feet from the point
of impact, that he was contributory negligent as a matter
of law. (Tr. 172)
Thereafter, the motion for a new trial was denied.
(Tr. 41.)
ASSIGN~IENTS

OF ERROR

Errors committed by the trial court upon which appellant relies for a reversal of the judgment:

r

I

1. That the court erred in gtanting defendant's motion
a directed
in favor
of bysaid
defendant
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in entering judgment thereon.
2. The court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for
a new trial.
ARGU~IENT

RIGHT OF WAY
We will not repeat the evidence as disclosed in the
statement of fact except as it is necessary to point out the
law applicable thereto.
The defendant, notwithstanding that he knew that
the roads the morning of the accident were in an icy and
slippery condition, proceeded to back his 29~ foot school
bus south-easterly across the road from his driveway until
it blocked the road to traffic travelling in either direction.
He did not, as would be expected of him by a driver coming from the west, back into the north lane, but continued without warning or signal to completely cross the
road, until the rear wheels were off the south side of the
hard surface of the road, and this he commenced to do
when the plaintiff was only about 110 to 120 feet away.
In contrast to this, the plaintiff, in the meantime, as
he proceeded down the road, kept a lookout, first seeing
the defenda!lt when about 300 feet away, at which time
he let up on the accelerator and the speed of his automobile was reduced to about 20 miles an hour. He continued to watch the defendant, always expecting that the
defendant would stop and yield him the right-of-way.
The first notice he had, however, that the defendant was
notS.J.going
toLibrary.
do so
was
when provided
he was
away
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from defendant's driveway. He then applied his brakes
and attempted to stop. He could not do so, however,
because of the condition of the road. In the meantime,
defendant pulled nearly across the road and then started
forward again. Plaintiff, however, at this point, attempteJ to avoid the accident by driving in front of the defendant. However, instead of defendant permitting him to
proceed in front of him, he pulled forward again and the
collision occurred just north of the center of the road.
Under these facts and conditions, question of whether
the defendant was negligent or not was a question for
the jury.
The Court had before it 57-7-139 U.C.A. l!J43, which
provides:
The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a
highway from a 1Jrir;ate road or driveway shall
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on said highway.

'-'

This section has not been construed by this court.
However, similar statutes of other states have been interpreted and they have uniformly held that in the curcumstnces similar to the one in question, the question of
whether a driver of a vehicle emerging from a driveway
into a pub1ic street was negligent in so doing was one for
the jury.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of Salters vs. Uhler 292 N. w: 762, reversed the decision of the
trial court, 'which directed verdict against the plaintiff
under the following facts. The plaintiff's evidence shows
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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miles an hour, he first noticed the defendant's vehicle
parked in a private driveway about 600 feet away. That
when 300 feet from the driveway, he turned toward the
center of the road. He was then going approximately 31
miles an hour. At about 250 feet from the driveway, the
bus started to leave the driveway at from 3 to 6 miles an
hour. The plaintiff continued to drive in the center of
the road with the idea of permitting defendant to stop
on the shoulder. When the front wheels of the defendants vehicle reached the top of the incline, he was about
150 feet away; that he was 75 feet away when defendant
reached the north edge of the pavement and going 25
miles an hour.
The defendant continued, however, and the collision occurred.
The Court said:
This state111ent is relevant he1'e as a reasonable
man plaintiff was entitled to assume that defendant would yield the right-of-way, at least until
a reasonable basis to the contrary appeared.L If
this were not so, the right-of-way would be of
little value and ordinary traffic on the highway
bottlenecked at every private driveway on which
a vehicle wa.~· approaching the main thoroughfare. Defendant owed the right-of-way, and on
the present record clearly violated it. Precisely
at what point plaintiff should have appreciated
that his right-of-way would be violated need not
be resolved now 0 0 o until a reasonable ground appearn! to make plaintiff appreciate that defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of plaintiffs presence, he had a right to assume
that due care would be exercised. It was for the
jury to decide whether plaintiff apprehended the
risk seasonable and the1'eafter conducted himself as a 1'easonable man.

In Keller vs. !\laricopa Tractor Company, et al, 123
P ( 2d) 166, the Arizona Court said:
Kehncke testified that he saw plaintiff approaching 15 feet before the front of his truck reached
the paved slab. He thus had warning that he
was endeavoring to cross the pathway of an approaching vehicle which had the right-of way.
We think that under such circumstances it was
his duty not to attempt the crossing unless, as a
reasonable prudent man, he had a right to believe he could complete it before the motorcycle
reached him. He did not look to see how far
away the motorcycle was just before the truck
entered the paved highway, but did look when
its front had reached the center of the road.
Even taking his own testimony as to his speed in
the light most favorable to him, it is evident that
when the front wheels of the truck were at the
edge of the pavement the motorcycle could have
been more than 600 feet away, which agrees
with plaintiff's teastimony on this point. Considering the length of the truck and trailer and
the slow speed at which it could travel, can we
say a jury could not legally have found it was
negligent for him not to look for and observe the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he entered the pavement, and seeing it at not
over 600 feet distance,not to wait till it had
passed.
The District Court of Appeals of California in the
case of .\lcDougall vs. :\lon-ison, 130 P ( 2d) 149, held
that where a vehicle stops at the edge of a road before
entering the highway and saw a vehicle 500 feet away,
that whether or not he was negligent in entering the highway and driving into the· highway was a question for the
jury.
The h"tle rule is that, under the section· of the
Vehicle Code above quoted, it is made the duty
of the driver of an automobile entering the highway from a private drive to look for approaching
cars, and not to proceed if one is coming, unless,
as a reasonably prudent and cautious person he
believes, and has a right to believe, that he can
pass in front of the other in safety. Wakefield
v. Horn, 109 Cal. App. 325, 293 P. 97; see, also
Conley v. i\!Iarvin, 210 Cal. 330, 291, P. 830; see
cases collected 5,Am. Jur. p. 670, & 306; Henderson v. O'Leary, 177 Wis. 130, 187 N.W. 994, 24
A.L.R. 946.
Each case must turn upon its own facts. Contributory negligence as a matter of law, can only
be found where reasonable minds cannot but
conclude that a reasonably careful and pruJent
person situated as was plaintiff would not have ·
acted as he did. The situations where a court
will so declare are rare. Casselman v. Hartford
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Ace,
& I. Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d. 700 98 P. 539;
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
Enz v. Johns, 112 Cal. App. 1, 296 P. 11.5. If
the evidence is in conflict, the finding of the
trier of the facts is conclusive.
See Parker etal vs. Brooks, 300 N.W. 400. Kosher
vs. Kocker, etal, 4 N.W. 2d 158, Nix vs. Wodworth, etal,
53 P. 2d 765.
The defendant in driving was required to exercise
care and caution commencerate with the occasion. Under the statute, he was required not to enter the highway
until under the circumstances he conld do so with reasonable certainty that he could do so with safety. Whether
he did or not was a question for the jury to decide.
SPEED
The Court said that the plaintiff was negligent in this
matter of law because of excessive speed. In this respect, the evidence showed that at the time and place in
question, that he was travelling about 25 miles an hour;
that upon seeing defendant's bus emerging from the side
of his- house that he took his foot off the accelerator and
slowed down, and that accordingly in the distance of
about 50 feet his automobile slowed down to 20 miles an
hour; that he continued thus to slow down and that he
only applied his brakes when the defendant pulled his
bus across the road in front of him. The defendant created an emergency. The plaintiff used the best judgment
he had under the circumstances. 'iVhether he should
have applied his brakes was a question for the jury. He
did all in his power to avoid the accident. What more
he could have done does not appear. The plaintiff concedes
although
thefor digitization
maximum
speed
limit
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Sponsored
by the S.J. that
Quinney Law
Library. Funding
provided by
the Institute
of Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
here was 60 miles an hour that he could not travel at such
a rate but that he was compelled to drive at a speed not
greater than would be reasonable and pntdent under the
conditions having regard for the actual and potential conditions existing on the highway. That whether the rate
of ~peed that plaintiff was driving at that time of day in
question was negligence we believe was a question for
the jury.
In the case of Humphreys vs. Complete Auto Transit
Inc., etal, 9 N. W. 2d 55, the Supreme Court of Michigan
said that where the plaintiff was driving at the rate of 25
to 40 miles an hour on icy roads was a question for the
jury. The defendant moved for a directed verdict. The
motion was denied and the case submitted to the jury.
From a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appealed.
The Court said:
In the case at bar, there was testimony that the
defendant had driven over this highway on numet'D1lS occassions and on all kinds of weather conditions. On the day of the accident, the pavement
was generally icy. The defendant could see an
object the size of an automobile at a distance of
700 feet, yet he did not see plaintiff's car before
the impact. II e was travelling at the rate of ft·om
25 to 40 miles per hour. He knew of the decline
in the pavement but he did nothing to reduce his
speed. Considering all the circumstances, we
are of the opinion that reasonable minds might
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ligent.
fury.

The question was therefore one for the

In the case of Eisenhower, etal, vs. Halls ~fotor Transit Company, etal,40 Atl. 2d, 458, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that where a truck and trailer was
loaded and driving at from 20 to 30 miles an hour on a
downward slope, and in so doing failed to negotiate the
turn and skidded into a tree, that whether such was negligence was a question for the jury.
The Court said:

According to what may be a permissable rate
of speed at one time and place and under given
circumstances, may be wholly i-mproper on other
on other occasions and different circumstances,
and in cases where unusual conditions that exist,
it has been held that the question as to speed was
for the jury.
See: Rr~ssel vs. Berger, 30 N. E. 2nd, 642.
CO~\'CLUSIO~

Decision of the tr.i:1l court should not be permitted
to stand, it should be reversed. To hold that a driver of
a vehicle because he drives on slippery roads of 25 miles
an hour, is negligent as a matter of law ignores all the
facts cognizant with every day driving. Furthermore,
to permit a driver of a vehicle emerging from a private
driveway into a public way to do so when a vehicle is approaching within the distance the facts in the case disclose, is to defeat the very purpose for which the statHte
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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conditions of the road. He started from a stopped position, thus having control over the situation in all of its
aspect. Nevertheless he elected to proceed onto the highway knowing, or he should have known, that to do so
would likely involve the school bus he was driving and the
plaintiff's vehicle in a collision. To say the least, the
questions to be resolved here are one for the jury and the
trial court in directing a verdict for the defendant invaded the jnrys province.
We respectfully ask that the decision be reversed and
that a new trial be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

NEWELL G. DAINES
L. DELOS DAINES,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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